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Exploring Et ical Grounding 
For Architecture: 
Four Lenses 
GREGORY S. PALERMO 
Iowa State University 
PROLOGUE 
Ethics asks: What is good? What is aretd excellencelvirtue? What 
is right? What is just.' 
Central questions of the discipline of architecture, architectural 
education and architecture's multiple modes of practicing are: What 
are architecture's intents, purposes and impacts? Do the acts of 
designing and building our habitat intrinsically embrace the ques- 
tions that ethics asks? Commonsense may answer yes due to 
architecture's fundamental role in addressing human needs. Given 
that architecture is thought, process and object, and that its purposes 
range from shelter and construction to engaging "beauty" and 
theoretical and utopian speculation, what would the grounding for 
those ethics be? 
The four lenses of aesthetics, architecture's rhetoric and ideolo- 
gies, its social purposes, and applied ethics in practice, briefly 
sketched here, provide a framework for considering the ethical 
nature of architecture. It is through the practical efforts at giving 
form, speculatively and physically, to the environment we inhabit 
that the field of ethics is engaged. Any one set of particular architec- 
tural activities can be viewed in terms of ethical reflection and 
action; can be defined and explored in classical ethical terms. It is 
at this point that architecture's ethical nature is revealed, and from 
which inquiry, understanding and construction of its ethical ground- 
ing can proceed. 
NOTES ON ARCHITECTURE 
Architecture is commonly defined as "1. The art or science of 
building or constructing edifices of any kind for human use. ... But 
Architecture is sometimes regarded solely as a fine art ... ; 2. The 
action or process of building," (Oxford English Dictionav [OED]); 
"1. The art and science of designing and erecting buildings," (Atneri- 
can Heritage Dictionary, 3rd. ed.). These dictionary definitions are 
clearly not the whole of it, but they have a compelling accuracy at 
their core. Architecture is about the particular places we shape in the 
landscape for our inhabitation; about their consideration, design, and 
fabrication. Habitat construction is an intentional act we undertake: 
art and craft and human intents are brought together regarding the 
places we inhabit. 
Architecture has to do with human purposes and inhabitation - 
shaping, making, sheltering, dwelling. From simple dwellings to 
great edifices, to memorials and monuments, to infrastructural 
networks, we are engaged in modifying the inherited landscape, 
natural and man-made, for our present and projected needs and 
desires. The contemporary situation is that we are within the land- 
scape of artifice from birth. 
Our understanding of the world, the physical one and the one of 
human relations, is shaped by our habitat. Compare the agrarian 
landscape of the Central Plains to that of Chicago. From northern 
Indiana toeasternNebraska the horizonis below one's shoulders, the 
sky a full hemisphere above. One looks through the landscape across 
fields and betweenshelterbelts. The Jeffersoniangrid is palpable and 
visible. Multi-generational farmsteads are still visible in this age of 
corporate farming. One can discern one's personal place and one's 
family's place withinit. It is a built agrarianethos. Incomparison, the 
streets and avenues of the near north side of Chicago are bordered 
with 3 to 6 story buildings. Its crowded pavements and storefronts, 
the above grade transit rumbling overhead every 15 minutes, the sky 
not a dome but a slice, the space of alleyways in lieu of fields, the 
knowledgethat withinan arc of twenty miles live four million people 
in a continuation of this physical structure, all combine to give the 
experience of Chicago its own pulse. The Jeffersonian grid, inter- 
rupted by a few diagonals (the historic paths and railway lines that 
used to connect separate but now merged communities) on the plain, 
is palpable and present here too. One can discern one's place within 
it and one's family's place within it. It is a constructed urban 
industrial commercial marketplace ethos. Each is a complete world 
with a physical structure that arises from and in turn shapes the 
culture of which it is an exemplar. One obtains a good sense of the 
distinctiveness of place and its formation of ourselves that is exam- 
ined by Norberg-Schulz in his reading and extension of Heidegger,' 
and the construction of ethos that Karsten Harries considers 
architecture's ethical function.' 
Architecture addresses the forms and images of human habitat, 
the processes of its invention, its constructive technology and 
material fabrication. It includes the consideration of the history of 
the forms of places and their inhabitation; speculation and utopic 
propositions of what the forms and nature of being singly and 
collectively could be. Architecture has internal conventions of 
representation, judgment, composing. Our Western architectural 
psyche deals with Vitruvius' shadow in one way or another - 
honoring or critiquing "durability-utility-beauty," theory and prac- 
tice, what to know about, how to prepare ourselves, etc. Architecture 
is the professing and practicing of knowledge and skill about such 
things. 
This is the realm of architecture. It is portrayed in a language that 
is foreign to the deliberate reflection, dialectic argument and lan- 
guage of ethics. 
ARCHITECTURE'S ASSERTIONS OF SOCIAL 
'GOOD' AND ETHICS 
Architecture asserts its role in beinglproviding "a good" for 
society through building: theart andcraft, theory and practice, design 
and fabrication of the environment we inhabit. This assertion of the 
beneficial goodness of architecture has a long history in Western 
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architectural thought, stemming atleastback to Vitruvius. Vitruvius, 
in his Preface to Book I, of the Ten Books On Architecture, addresses 
Caesar Augustus: 
But when I saw that you were giving your attention not only 
to the welfare of society in general and to theestablishment of 
public order, but also to the providing of public buildings 
intended for utilitarian purposes, so that not only should the 
State have been enriched with provinces by your means, but 
that the greatness of its power might be likewise be attended 
with distinguished authority in its public buildings, I thought 
that I ought to take the first opportunity to lay before you my 
writings on this theme? 
Vitruvius undergirds Augustus' concern for the welfare of society 
and public with architecture, through which the goodness power and 
authority of the State is made manifest. He proposes an ethical 
architecture (at least in terms of the dominant ethos of his time). 
Fifteen hundred years later, Alberti takes up the same theme: the 
well-being of society through architecture. In his Prologue to On 
The Art of Building in Ten Books, he says: 
"Some have said that it was fireand water which wereinitially 
responsible for bringing men together into communities, but 
we, considering how useful, even indispensable, a roof and 
walls are for men, are convinced that it was they that drew and 
kept men together. We  are indebted to the architect not only 
for providing that safe and welcome refuge from the heat of 
the sun and the frosts of winter (that of itself is no small 
benefit), but also for his many other innovations, useful both 
to individuals and the public, which time and time again have 
so happily satisfied daily needs."'After listing various contri- 
butions, he begins his summation "To, conclude let it be said 
that the security, dignity, and honor of the republic depend 
greatly upon the architect: it is he who is responsible for our 
delight, entertainment, and health while at leisure, and our 
profit and advantage while at work, and in short, that we live 
in a dignified manner, free from any danger."6 
Alberti links individual, communal and societal well-being to the 
architect's works. 
The first reference in English to the "fine art" of architecture cited 
by the OED is from John Ruskin's The SevenLampsofArchitecture: 
"Architecture is the art which so disposes and adorns the edifices 
raised by man . . that the sight of them contributes to his mental 
health, powerand pleasure."This is aclearexpressionof architecture's 
'good benefits' to humanity, to its flourishing, which perhaps could 
only be interpreted as ethical at its core. 
This tradition of architects, from within the discipline of architec- 
ture, asserting the beneficial link to societal well-being, continues to 
the present. A recent manifestation comes from the Congress of the 
New Urbanism through its Charter which states "We recognize that 
physical solutions by themselves will not solve social and economic 
problems, but neither can economic vitality, community stability, 
and environmental health be sustained without a coherent and 
supportive framework."' The Charter goes on to discuss the city, 
neighborhoods, blocks, streets and buildings - all within the 
province of architecture and related environmental design disci- 
plines. 
The ethical content of architecture is professed from within the 
discipline of architecture in other ways. The Vitruvian triad provides 
us with the first three design imperatives of what architecture ouglzt 
ro provide: durability, convenience and beauty. Palladio requires 
that the three need to be simultaneously present in architecture, both 
private and public: "That work cannot be called perfect, which 
should be useful and not durable, nor durable and not useful, or 
having both of these should be without b e a ~ t y . " ~  These go beyond 
design imperatives to ethical imperatives. Architectural work that is 
lacking in these properties cannot contain virtue
y (arete3 or goodness 
(agathos), and thus is anunethical practice, not merely faulty design. 
From various quarters there are other calls for an ethical architec- 
ture: The public architecture of a democracy ought to be accessible 
to the disabled. Architecture ought to be designed in a manner 
consistent with sustainable environmental practices. Context ought 
to inform architecture. We ought to save the revered architecture of 
our past, to reuse it, to reinvigorate it. Architecture has a revealing 
function with respect to the societal status quo, and ought to critique 
it. These oughts are presented as ethical duties. 
NOTES ON ETHICS 
Ethics is one of the principal divisions of philosophy. Following 
Socrates' lead in Plato's Apology, it is the inquiry into living a 
worthy life. Itasks: Whatisgood? Whatis right? What isfairorjust? 
In what manner should I act in order to act with excellence or virtue? 
Each of these beneficial quests is paired with their logical obverse: 
baaevil; wrong; unjust; and dissoluteness. Stemming from G. E. 
Moore's simple but bedeviling question of how we know what 
"good" is (since it is not an object, is couched in language, and is 
usually described by relating examples of "good" rather than the 
property "good"),l0 much of 20th-C Anglo-American philosophical 
ethics has been engaged in attempting to understand the status 
(objective, subjective, natural, intuitive, emotive, etc.) of this value 
term and others, and how they might be the basis for action, or even 
if we could infer an "ought to" action from a value. These secondary 
questions of the questions of ethics are meta-ethics. 
Ethics presumes a certain condition of those persons engaged in 
the consideration of ethical questions, and acertain status of human- 
ity in general: that people are thoughtful in their considerations; that 
there is not only a concern of self, but also of one's relationship to 
others; that the means for mutual inhabitation lies in the will and 
capacity for persons to negotiate personal and public relations with 
others"; that persons have autonomy and free wills, that they have 
a right to life, and to personal physical security, and that they have 
equal standing with others. Without these, there is no basis for 
discourse. 
Ethical reflection and action also have a set of requirements. One 
is the discernment of the facts of an ethical dilemma: the who and 
what of the situation. A second is the identification of the ethical 
question(s) at hand; the values at stake, and possible outcomes of the 
dilemma given various choices. Another is reasoned consideration 
of competingclaims, values and choices for acting with regard to the 
dilemmain terms ofvarious ethical frameworks. Ethicists may differ 
on the approach to discerning the "facts" and the underlying basis for 
an approach to action, but these beginning points are implicitly 
assumed. 
There are perhaps four broadly encompassing foundations of 
ethics to which other positions refer or within which they are 
enveloped: consequences from action (teleological ethics; 
Consequentialism); action stemming from principles (deontics); 
actions stemming from virtue (virtue ethics); and action based upon 
agreements (contractarianism). 
Teleological ethics deals with ends and means, actions toward 
them - ends, or net positive consequences, being the moral objects 
of good, right, fairness, etc. Utilitarianism and its approach to 
identifying and calculating the maximized benefit in a given situa- 
tion is the primeexample of a teleological ethics. Utility theory is the 
underlying premise of costlbenefit standards, often applied in urban 
planning and public policy, which maximize good for the public 
benefit of the most persons. The telos toward "happiness" is traced 
to Aristotle, and that of net utility benefits to Bentham and Mill. For 
a corrupt mode, there is Machiavelli.12 
Kantian ethics13 is a prime example of deontic ethics. However 
one arrives at guiding principles - through reason or intuition for 
example- they areuniversal and necessarily apply to all situations. 
The guiding principle that life is sacred leads to choices that do not 
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take lives, regardless of the possible negative consequences to some 
of the participants in the situation. The recent film Saving Private 
Ryan is an example of deontic ethics: eight men to save the last of 
four sons, for a mother who has lost three sons already; it is a moral 
duty to prevent more loss to the mother. 
Virtue ethics is rooted in Greek ethics of euclclilnonia -roughly 
translated as happiness (not of the giddy sort), which for the Greeks 
included personal virtue and excellence of mind and character. The 
virtue and excellence of being take into account classic virtues such 
as temperance, courage, and truthfulness, as well as performing 
one's role or obligations well in a community of persons. Thus, 
virtue theory extends to (or from) communal relations, and is not 
solely private. Virtue theory may be bracketed by Aristotle and 
MacIntyre.14 
The final enduring tradition is rooted in individualism, libertari- 
anism and agreement - the social contract among equals, who may 
in fact have conflicting ethical objects. The premium is the au- 
tonomy of the individual. The political collective, the state, or the 
moral collective establish sufficient agreement to permit action. 
Hobbes, Rousseau and Rawls are  exemplar^.'^ Rawls' 20th-C con- 
tribution is in bringing utilitarian and deontic conceptions of the 
societal good into a decision framework that mediates conflicting 
status positions and objects, thus shifting the focus from utility, 
power and judgment to justice and moral agreement. 
There are many other "isms" in ethics. For example, relativism 
(which has a primary position in what is clearly a multi-cultural 
world of differences), -an ethics that accepts that differing cultures 
and groups have differing, equally valid values that are consistent in 
their time and place and valid for the community of persons centered 
around them, and which may in fact be inconflict with other systems; 
or egoism - the proposition that humans act to maximize their self- 
interest and happiness (in the pleasure sense); or a contemporary 
feminist alternative to the public political ethics tradition, the ethics 
of caring - where one's ethical actions are guided by a nurturing, 
emotive, caring model that stresses relationships over "rules," "prin- 
ciples" or "judgment." Ethical conflicts arising from these perspec- 
tives are usually resolved by appealing to the four principal theories 
presented above. In all cases there is an attempt to consider and do 
"good," or "right" or "fair" with respect to self and others in a given 
situation. 
Ethics and ethics discourse takes place in this realm. This is a 
realm that seems very far from the context of architecture and its 
discourse. 
DISCERNING ARCHITECTURE'S INTERSEC- 
TIONS WITH ETHICS: FOUR LENSES 
Given the questions ethics asks and the ethical assertions from 
within the discourse of architecture, how are the two linked? Archi- 
tecture is a subject of history and sociology, of economics and 
power, and of aesthetics. Without ethical content however, or only 
asserting its ethics self-referentially from within, architecture seems 
doomed to speak to itself, disconnected fromany cultural rootedness. 
Without that grounding, architecture is capricious art on one hand or 
iconographic commodity on another - both of which are the 
manners by which it is perceived and treated by much of contempo- 
rary society at large and social critics.16 
With discourses and traditions so dissimilar, one may wonder in 
what manner(s) the two disciplines intersect, and in what ways 
architecture not only asserts its ethics from within, but how it may be 
perceived and understood as an ethical practice. How do we get 
through the intuitive to a reasoned consideration of the issue? Recent 
efforts include the following: Design image and making as moral 
enterprise as seen through Pugin and Pevsner are taken up by David 
Watkin in M o r a l i ~  and Architecture. Karsten Harries critiques 
aesthetic legitimation for architecture's ethics in The Ethical Func- 
tion of Archirecture, linking architecture to a manifestation of 
culture, a construction of ethos. Philip Bess presents an Aristotelian 
and communitarian view." This is where I would like to begin - 
proposing a means by which to more generally access the ethical 
issues in architecture, and by extension, to explore architecture's 
ethical grounding. Presented herein brief outline are four lenses with 
which to examine the ethicallarchitectural conflation. 
The Lens of Aesthetics 
The first lens is that of architecture's relationship to art, its being 
anart, and thenceto the philosophy of art and aesthetics, the beautiful 
and the sublime, and human flourishing. This may be the most 
debated issue of ethics in architecture, because for many it is the self- 
aware "art"fulness of architecture that differentiates "architecture" 
from mere "building." In its role of giving form, beauty, image and 
meaning to societal expectations, aspirations or needs, we look to 
discern architecture's embodin~ent of moral force. 
Since the Enlightenment, art has had autonomy as its order. That 
is, the artist's role is an autonomous one in society in that it may help 
define or critique culture, and may reveal the essence of conditions 
of life in a manner distinct from reason and empiricism, but it does 
not owe a duty (practical or utilitarian) to culture or to others beyond 
the artist's ethic. TheEnlightenment perspective supersumed earlier 
notions of art's relationship to nature, to the divine and society and 
its role of revealing the true nature of things, and its re-presenting the 
order of reality in ways that other modes - reason and science - 
could not. In this view, architecture, being enmeshed in human 
purposes for inhabitation and aspiration, is a lesser art than the pure 
fine arts, and cannot exist as art for art's sake. When it asserts itself 
as such, beyond its role as artistic production it has no compelling 
moral force- that is, it is no longer architecture which by definition 
has a conceptual purpose, but art object which has aesthetic "purpo- 
siveness without purpose" as its inherent object.18 Architecture is 
thus in suspension between Vitruvius who posits the aesthetic 
content of beauty as the differentiating characteristic of architecture 
above mere building, and the post-Enlightenment perspective that 
limits architecture's role as an art because of its links to utility and 
material craft. 
These themes have been takenup in articles by L. Krukowski, who 
attempts to build a bridge between art, morality and aesthetics; 
David Bell who critiques the conception of the disinterested autono- 
mous artist and connoisseurship as well as the ethical force of 
architectural forms per se, and posits an interactivist mode of 
construction and form giving; Watkin who attacks 19th and 20th-C 
theoreticians and historians who assert fixed truth and moral agency 
to architecture of various aesthetic styles and forms; and Harries, 
who argues against aesthetics as the foundation for architecture's 
ethical function." 
The Lens of Architecture's Rhetoric and Ideologies 
The second lens of ethical consideration is that from within 
architecture's rhetoric and ideologies. We  will use a few examples 
ofdesigndriven ideologies to illustrate this perspective. The Modern 
Movement's intentions were profoundly ethical: that is, to make an 
architecture of the modern era, to utilize current technology, to 
discard the historical styles and academic architecture, and to 
address social projects such as worker's housing. When combined, 
these strategies were to sweep aside capitalist bourgeois class 
restrictions and to make a more egalitarian society, using architec- 
ture as a vehicle to give form and expression to these concepts. 
Whatever its naivetC, and even though after the Museum of Modern 
Art exhibition of 193 1 the aesthetic of modernism was usurped as an 
object of connoisseurship and adopted by the modern corporation 
(exactly opposite its original intents), it began as an ethical proposi- 
tion.?O 
As early as Horatio Greenough in the 1840's, observers in 
America were calling for a "true American architecture," one that 
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would cast off Europe's formal iconic precedents and which would 
emerge from American climate, functional necessities (the settle- 
ment of America, its commerce and the construction of its institu- 
tions), and expression." These are later taken up through Sullivan 
and Wright, in contradistinction to the impact of the 1893 Chicago 
Exposition which looked to the European beaux arts. Another 
ideology with ethical force is that of sustainable design, designing in 
resource-conserving ways, and with materials and methods that 
slow the degradation of resources, so that future generations will 
have a world to inhabit.22 In the Creenough, Wright, Sullivan and 
environmental sustainability ideologies interlocking aspirational 
intention, social-political-economic-cultural threads, and formal 
strategies to support them are proposed as the premises for a "true 
architecture," an ethical architecture. 
More conservative positions, relying upon the relationship of 
architecture to power, social elites, controlling mores, and thus 
architecture's power to construct order (while simultaneously ex- 
cluding "others") is another aspect of the ethical in architecture 
linked to rhetoric and i d e ~ l o g y . ~ '  
In addition to ethics which arise from design ideologies, there are 
special ethics that may arise from process ideologies, e.g., the 
paradigm of professionalization. The contemporary professional 
paradigm, based upon learned knowledge exercised with judgment 
in unique cases and disciplinary and legal professional autonomy, 
entails a social exchange corollary that demands of the professional 
complete trustworthiness. It demands provision of the vital knowl- 
edge even to those who cannot pay; this is the professional ethic of 
the Hippocratic Oath and the public defender system.24 
Doubts with regard to architecture's claims for special ethics 
based upon its body of knowledge and expertise, service and 
trustworthiness, goes at least back to Aristotle: "There are some arts 
whose products are not judged solely, or best, by the artists them- 
selves, namely the those arts whose products are recognized even by 
those who do not possess the art; for example, the knowledge of the 
house is not limited to the builder [architect] only; the user of the 
house will be a better judge than the builder."" Architecture has 
pursuedand legally implemented the forms of the professional ethos, 
but whether it is indeed a profession of trustworthy service, of duty 
to those in need, is highly debatable. It is perhaps this difficulty, and 
the fact that many laypersons (who are not architects) have the 
knowledgeand skills todesignandbuild, that undercutsarchitecture's 
claims to professionalism, and thus to a special ethics. 
The Lens of Social Purpose 
The third lens through which we examine architecture is that of 
social purpose for beneficial programs, and its social purpose as 
communal cultural construction. We are in the world we have 
inherited, we value it, we imbue it with meaning, it shapes our 
perspective, as we shape it for ourselves. Architects are participating 
agents in that shaping: the ones that propose form and images, 
bringing to bear their specialized knowledge and skills of history, 
technology, construction, and aesthetics. 
However, rarely are architects very often participants in the 
critical stage when, individually or collectively, persons or commu- 
nities decide to intervene and change their world, whether it is to 
build achurch, a school, anew home, a new factory orlaboratory. As 
we identify these projects, we type the world. Just as we could chart 
a spectrum of architectural challenges from memorials, which have 
a pure symbolic, memory constructing aspiration, to nuclear power 
plants and transplant surgical theaters, which are driven by techno- 
logical imperatives and functional perfection for safety, we'could 
charta spectrum of architectural social contribution: from architec- 
ture as art, to institutions of communal aspiration (schools, day care 
centers, churches and temples), to service and care (hospices, 
housing for the poor, for the homeless, hospitals), to places of 
commerce and labor, to places of control such as prisons, and to 
machinery of war (defensive and offensive machinery conceived 
quite differently depending one's "side"). We can characterize 
modes of designing and decision making from self-help and partici- 
patory models to autocratic ones. 
Architecture is carried out in these various circumstances and/or 
within the critical consideration of such ordering programs. The key 
is, we areenmeshed in the making. Some hold that it is architecture's 
focus on autonomy of its forms and processes, in lieu of focusing on 
its social engagement of processes, human purposes and forms, that 
has diminished its ethical role and its value to ~oc ie ty . '~  To select a 
client or to work on a particular type of project are fundamental 
ethical choices distinct from the ideological or aesthetic position one 
brings to the project. 
The Lens of Practices 
The fourth lens is that of ethics in the action of architectural 
practices, the applied ethics of architecture. Architecture is en- 
meshed in a world of the processes of reflection conception design 
andconstruction; of clients, contractors, and individual craftspeople; 
of those people who use and experience the environments being 
designed; of contracts, licenses, safety codes; of the larger general 
public who may be affected by resource allocation decisions and the 
final form of architectural solutions and who may be of diverse 
ethnic religious racial and international cultures; and of financiers, 
manufacturers and materials and furnishing suppliers. 
Many seemingly everyday events in architectural practices are 
ethical in their import: business and marketing choices (deciding on 
what projects to undertake, with whom to work, the values of each 
etc.); design deliberations and critiques (function, aesthetics, con- 
cepts); budgets (durability of architecture, value for expenditure); 
client and contractor interactions (honoring contracts, fairness, trust 
and advising); contracts (equitable conditions, value for service, 
mutual respect and duties); public presentations (who has the right 
to know and be advised about projects); and staff development and 
recognition. While these issues appear under the guises of profes- 
sional practice and debates over the classic Vitruvian design trilogy 
of firmness-commodity-delight, embedded within them are ethical 
questions. Duties to self, the client, the general public, and to the 
discipline itself can clearly be traced. They are ethical, and demand 
an ethics. It is in the particular questions, in particular circum- 
stances, that architecture's ethics are shaped. When we pull the 
threads on one of these everyday concerns what unravels are the 
deepest questions and premises of the discipline. 
A BEGINNING 
Architecture is an intrinsically ethical endeavor. The four lenses 
proposed here are ameans by which to access theethical dimensions 
of architecture. Particular architectural situations viewed through 
the aesthetic, ideological, social or practical frameworks may be 
cross-examined in light of the four principal ethical theories re- 
viewed here. Together the lenses and ethical frameworks can be used 
instrumentally to identify ethical dimensions throughout the archi- 
tectural curriculum. Technology, history and theory, and the studio 
can be seen as they are - non-neutral, value-charged, places of 
architectural action. Non-neutral because virtually no architectural 
choice is free of social, environmental, political implications. Value- 
charged, because each choice advances a perspective through which 
to pursue architecture. 
NOTES 
' These are classicquestions of Western ethics, and 20th-C Anglo- 
American ethical studies. Although significant critiques have 
been leveled against their formulation and the literature and 
reasoning that supports their debate, e.g., feminism and Conti- 
nental philosophy, all ethical quests including those of the 
critiques are concerned with what manner to live and act ethi- 
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cally. From that shared objective, these questions continue to 
have validity. 
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used by Alasdair MacIntyre in Afrer Virtue, 2nd, ed., (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), Chap. 14 "The 
Nature of Virtues" 187, passim. Aretd embodies the concept of 
excellence of being. Agcltllos defines goodness in terms of how 
well a person, practice or thing fulfills the objects of its expected 
content and roles: a military general must be "general like;" a 
building must possess the best attributes of "building." 
'O George Edward Moore, Principiu Etllica (1903) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 19591, pp. 3-15. 
I '  For an example see Jurgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and 
Co~mrlunicative Action, tran. Christian Lehhardt and Shierry 
W-eber Nocholsen, intro. Thomas McCarthy, (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1990), pp. 65-66. proposing an alternative to Kantian 
universals and Rawls' "original position," with respect to valid 
universalizable norms and processes of ethical discourse: "1111 
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